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1 Introduction
This paper examines whether and to what degree a government of a small open econ-
omy tends to compensate domestic industries for unilaterally introduced environmental
regulations by moving to more protectionist trade-policy patterns. Speciﬁcally, I ana-
lyze the impact of an exogenously introduced binding cap on sector-wide emissions on
the political choice of a compensating production subsidy to that sector.
This allows me to shed light on the question whether environmental regulations lead
to a loss of competitiveness (measured in terms of proﬁts) in the domestic polluting
sector, as claimed by industry representatives and many economists.1 In particular, I
argue that this may not be the case, if endogenous trade-policy reactions are taken into
account.2
This issue is relevant for example in connection with the introduction of the European
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) for CO2 on January 1st, 2005, which is targeted at
achieving the reductions in Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) agreed on in the Kyoto-protocol.
Aggregated over all EU member countries, GHG emissions have to be reduced by 8%
up to the year 2012, compared to the base year 1990.3,4
For countries that ratiﬁed the Kyoto-protocol, the negotiated emissions reductions be-
come binding so that the introduction of a cap on total emissions can be considered as
exogenous.5
1See the literature related to the pollution havens hypothesis, e.g. Copeland/Taylor (2003) or
Levinson/Taylor (2004), among many others, or Rauscher (1994). OECD (2006) provides some the-
oretical and empirical case studies, e.g. for the steel sector, concerning the sectoral competitiveness
impacts of diﬀerent environmental policy measures.
In what concerns the term “competitiveness” which is often used in the public debate, there are diverse
views on how to measure this appropriately. At the ﬁrm level like in this paper, possible indicators
besides proﬁts/proﬁtability include market share, productivity or a composite measure of all (see e.g.
Triebswetter (2003), pp. 40). Furthermore, many diﬀerent measures at a national level exist (for
a discussion see e.g. Mulatu (2004), pp. 53 or OECD (2006), pp. 68). In the following, the term
“competitiveness” is used as synonym for “proﬁt”.
2The output-based production subsidy to the polluting sector considered in this paper can equiva-
lently be interpreted as industrial- or trade-policy measure because an open economy is analyzed. In
the following, the expression “trade policy” will be used.
3For details see http : //unfccc.int/essential_background/items/2877.php and Klepper/Peterson
(2004).
4Although not only the EU countries alone, but altogether 168 countries (up to december 2006)
have ratiﬁed the protocol, the EU can be seen as the only ratifying region so far which has really
implemented binding policy restrictions in order to achieve the emissions target. At least, the EU-
ETS is singular in the world so far in terms of its economic scale (i.e. the value of traded allowances),
like e.g. PEW Center (2005), pp. 3, Grubb/Neuhoﬀ (2006), pp. 9 or Demailly/Quirion (2006), pp.
93 argue. Hence, environmental policy can be considered as unilateral in this case. Of course, the
EU-ETS is only an illustrative example; many other environmental regulations applied in any country
can be thought of instead.
5Admittedly, those policies are only exogenous at the moment of their introduction; during the
preceding treaty negotiations, each country exercised inﬂuence in direction of a favorable outcomeThe Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 3
Before the EU-ETS was actually introduced, an intense debate on the economic con-
sequences of such a measure went on in the EU member countries. Industry repre-
sentatives expressed their concerns about the economic costs of such a trading scheme
and feared a loss of international competitiveness compared to countries not participat-
ing in the ETS. For example, in November 2005, the Federation of German Industries
(BDI) in a position paper claimed that unilateral European climate policy would have
only little impact on global warming while seriously harming the competitiveness of
European industries. Not surprisingly, this interest group prefers voluntary industry
commitments, like e.g. pursued by the United States, to legal emission restrictions for
the second period of the Kyoto-protocol, 2008-12 (BDI (2005), p. 8). In the UK, as an-
other example, the public debate on the competitiveness eﬀects of environmental policy
preceding the introduction of the EU-ETS caused a signiﬁcant delay of the country´s
2005-07 national allocation plan (NAP)-submission to the European Commission (see
PEW Center (2005), pp. 11 or Smale et al. (2006), p. 30).6
As governments are not immune to such political pressures from important industries,
some policy concession can be expected that helps the aﬀected groups accept the envi-
ronmental restrictions imposed on them. In this paper, I investigate such a governmen-
tal reaction with respect to trade policy. In doing so, one has to consider that trade
policies are usually restricted within GATT or within the EU. That is why I model trade
policy in terms of a production subsidy rather than a tariﬀ. In the EU, for example,
subsidies are granted in terms of “State Aid” which is generally prohibited, but many
exceptions exist (e.g. Aid for regional development purposes or so-called “horizontal
objectives” like support for speciﬁc sectors, employment, R&D etc.).7 Hence, govern-
ments may well introduce the ETS, while at the same time compensating the aﬀected
from its own point of view. However, as soon as some environmental objective is set by the overall
number of treaty-participants, each can be assumed to comply with it. This is reasonable despite of
a lacking worldwide “monitoring-institution” for environmental issues. Besides the “hard” economic
dimension of policy decisions, countries also consider the “soft” political dimension: complying with
treaty obligations demonstrates stability and reliability to the international community and so helps to
build a good reputation. Hence, in order not to jeopardize current and future international cooperation,
countries tend to countervail the potential negative economic eﬀects of their environmental treaty-
compliance by means of diﬀerent policy measures rather than by not complying (this line of reasoning
is perfectly consistent with the analysis in this paper).
6Other papers dealing with the above-mentioned debate include e.g. Demailly/Quirion (2006) or
Grubb/Neuhoﬀ (2006).
7Although data on subsidy payments have to be interpreted with caution due to incompleteness
and diﬀering deﬁnitions/measurement methods depending on their source (for details on those data
issues see WTO (2006), pp. 110), one can observe the following evolution of State Aid patterns in the
EU (15) countries: The overall ratio of Aid to GDP remained rather stable between 2000 and 2004,
while Aid granted to the manufacturing sector rose from 24.3 to 33.5 billion Euros within the same
period (see WTO (2006), p. 159).
In 2005, total Aid payments in the EU-25 countries amounted to 64 billion Euros which
is equivalent to 0.6 percent of total GDP. Of this amount, 59 percent went to the man-
ufacturing sector. The EU Commission´s target of reducing Aid-amounts turned out to
be hard to meet. (see the European Commission´s Homepage on State Aid, http :
//europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html).The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 4
sectors by subsidizing their output.8 A recent example for such behavior is illustrated
in section 2.
In the context of this European experience, the aim of this paper is to investigate
whether industry concerns with respect to adverse competitiveness-eﬀects of environ-
mental regulations are generally justiﬁed. Should one really expect an overall loss in the
proﬁtability of the aﬀected industries if one considers endogenous trade-policy reactions,
more speciﬁcally, reactions in the choice of the subsidy-rate?
To analyze this issue, a simple small-open-economy model with sector-speciﬁc capital in
two sectors will be applied. The import-competing sector produces a polluting good by
using labor, capital and an environmental factor (i.e. emissions), while the export sector
produces a clean numeraire good with only labor and capital. The economy consists of
households supplying either labor or one of two types of speciﬁc capital. A household´s
utility is simply measured in terms of its income. In addition, an environmental interest
group derives disutility from environmental damage. I assume that a binding exogenous
cap on total emissions is introduced, lowering productivity in the polluting sector. The
endogenous trade-policy reaction to this is analyzed in a political-economy framework,
in which the government maximizes a political support function over all interest groups.
The main results of this study can be summarized as follows: First, there is indeed a
tendency of governments to compensate industries subject to restrictive environmental
regulations. Second, as it turns out that compensation is more than complete in the
presence of an environmental interest group, polluting industries will experience a net
gain in proﬁts rather than a loss. The environmental interest´s political weight has a
positive impact on the degree of industry compensation or, put diﬀerently, environmen-
tal interests work in the direction of more protectionist trade regimes although they are
not directly aﬀected by the trade policy under consideration.9
The conceptual basis for the current paper goes back to Hillman (1982) who devel-
oped a political-support-function approach to analyze the incentives a government
has to protect declining industries. This approach was taken up by Bommer/Schulze
(1999), who adapted it to answer the question which impact trade liberalization has
8In what concerns a government´s motive for adjusting production subsidies, WTO (2006), pp.
65 points out that one potential objective is income redistribution. Similarly to the framework in the
current paper, subsidies to declining industries in the course of structural transformation are mentioned
as an example. In addition, diﬀerent case studies in OECD (2006), pp. 42 illustrate how compensation
for losses of competitiveness is actually granted to polluting sectors in case of restrictive environmental
policies.
9An opposing result was derived by Hillman/Ursprung (1994), though in a diﬀerent framework (i.e.
there is two-party political competition in a partial-equilibrium framework, the foreign industry acts
as a lobby group in the domestic country, lobbies pay campaign contributions to parties, markets are
subject to imperfect competition): They found that, if environmentalists do not care about the foreign
environment (i.e. they are “greens” and not “super-greens”) and pollution is caused by production
(rather than consumption), assumptions that also hold in this paper, the environmental interest group
will favor freer trade over protection. In general, however, environmentalists favor protectionist trade
policy regimes like in my paper.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 5
on environmental-policy choice. The authors do not model trade policy explicitly; it is
rather represented by changes in the relative price of the economy´s export good. The
analysis shows that trade liberalization will make domestic environmental policies more
restrictive if the polluting sector is the exporting one.
The present paper is closely related to the latter, but it reverses the question posed:
Whereas in Bommer/Schulze (1999), trade policy is exogenous and the government
chooses environmental policies, the current paper features exogenous environmental
restrictions due to membership in environmental treaties like the Kyoto-protocol and
the government chooses trade policy.
Concerning the research question, my approach also relates to Eliste/Fredriksson (2002)
and Ederington/Minier (2003). Eliste/Fredriksson (2002) consider the US agricultural
sector and analyze both theoretically and empirically whether the imposition of stricter
environmental regulations leads to increased government transfers to that sector. Al-
though their model diﬀers from mine in some respects,10 one basic result is the same:
Transfers to the polluting agricultural sector will indeed increase. This result is also
supported by the empirical analysis.
In their purely empirical analysis, Ederington/Minier (2003) address the question whether
international trade-agreements should be extended to also include environmental-policy
coordination. They suspect that, if trade policy is restricted by the commitment to in-
ternational treaties, environmental policy is used as second-best trade policy to support
domestic import-competing industries and ﬁnd that this is indeed the case.
Hence, both Eliste/Fredriksson (2002) and Ederington/Minier (2003) come to qualita-
tively similar results as the current paper: Import-competing sectors adversely aﬀected
by environmental restrictions are supported by endogenous policy-adjustments. How-
ever, diﬀerently from this paper, no conclusions with respect to the quantitative extent
of this compensation, resp. the net competitiveness-eﬀect of environmental regulations
are derived.
My paper diﬀers from Bommer/Schulze (1999) with respect to some speciﬁc features:
Here, for example, the polluting sector is the import-competing one instead of the
export sector. This corresponds to industry characteristics in the EU: The EU-ETS
so far involves ﬁrms in the energy-producing- and energy-intensive sectors like the
production of metals, the mineral industry and pulp, paper and board production (see
Klepper/Peterson (2004)). Within those sectors, the EU typically is a net importer.
For example in 2004, the EC-15 countries covered their own energy needs (i.e. oil, coal
10As the most important diﬀerences, the following are to be mentioned: First of all,
Eliste/Fredriksson (2002) use a partial-equilibrium model based on Grossman/Helpman (1994) ig-
noring policy repercussions on the clean numeraire sector and workers. Hence, those sectors are not
organized as lobbies. Second, the political-economy framework is a diﬀerent one: Instead of maximiz-
ing political support, governments in their model maximize a weighted sum of contribution payments
by the environmental- and agricultural (i.e. “dirty”) lobbies and social welfare. A third diﬀerence con-
cerns environmental policy: This is represented by a pollution tax instead of a total emissions limit.
As a consequence, environmental policy via agricultural output impacts on total emissions unlike in
my model.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 6
and natural gas) by only 50%, the remainder was imported from third countries (see
WTO (2004), p. 107). As data from EUROSTAT11 show, in 2004, the EU has also
been a net importer of mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. In the future,
the enlarged EU´s need for energy imports will still rise to up to 70% of total energy
use, as a press release by the EU Commission from July 24th, 2006, points out.
However, within the political-support-function framework chosen here, which assumes
that a government seeks to maximize a weighted aggregate of individual voter groups´
welfare, this distinction does not alter the results: As long as the compensating subsidy
is directly targeted at the polluting sector subject to environmental regulation, it does
not matter whether this sector is import-competing or exporting. In both cases, it
will be aﬀected by the regulations in an equivalent way, thus giving the government an
incentive for more protectionist behavior in form of increasing subsidy payments.12
Other papers using a political-support-function approach to analyze the trade/environment
relationship are for example Bommer (1996) or Rauscher (1997).13
However, most of the existing literature on the issue considers the trade regime or a
trade policy change as exogenous and concentrates on the endogenous determination of
environmental policies:14 Bommer (1996) analyzes the impact of changes in the tariﬀ
rate (which is used to represent all possible trade policy measures to be abolished in
the process of European integration) on the determination of production and process
standards in an imperfectly competitive market. He ﬁnds that under certain conditions
concerning the relative power of environmental interest groups in member countries
it is possible that environmental standards will be increased in the course of market
11See the information on http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1996,45323734&_
dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=Yearlies_new_environment
_energy&depth=4 .
12This is diﬀerent in Bommer/Schulze (1999) as they analyze the impact of trade liberalization
(generally inducing a change in the relative price of the export good) on the environmental policy-
choice. In that case, it is of course relevant whether the polluting sector is the importing or exporting
one, i.e. whether it loses or beneﬁts from freer trade.
13Besides those examples, the majority of analyses on the trade/environment relationship apply the
“protection-for-sale” approach by Grossman/Helpman (1994): Examples include Fredriksson (1997a,
b), Aidt (1998), Schleich (1999), Conconi (2000, 2003), Schleich/Orden (2000). Those papers are in
general concerned with the impacts diﬀerent lobby groups have on the determination of environmental-
and trade policies, and thus on environmental quality. Depending on the model assumptions e.g. with
respect to country size, policy availability or type of lobby, it turns out that neither the presence of en-
vironmental lobbies unambiguously implies stricter environmental policies nor that of industry lobbies
weaker policies. What can be stated, however, is that lobbies in general induce socially suboptimal
policy decisions.
Only Fredriksson (1997a), however, explicitly asks which eﬀects trade liberalization has on pollution
taxes and -levels. It turns out that declining tariﬀs may induce lower pollution taxes and thus higher
environmental damage. Hence, trade liberalization in a small country can no longer be considered to
be unambiguously welfare-increasing.
14One exception is the work by Hillman/Ursprung (1992, 1994), who analyze the determination of
trade policies when there are environmental concerns (i.e. interest groups). There is, however, no
environmental policies explicitly considered in their papers.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 7
integration.
Rauscher (1997) does not model trade policy explicitly: He assumes completely free
trade to be already prevalent and analyzes how diﬀerent measures of environmental
policy are determined in the presence of interest group inﬂuence. In his approach,
environmental policy serves as implicit trade policy. There are situations in which
both lobby groups, environmentalists and the speciﬁc production factor, favor stringent
environmental policies, but opposing interests may also arise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section provides an illustra-
tive example of how governments might compensate domestic polluting industries for
environmental regulations. Section 3 presents the basic model by introducing all rel-
evant interest groups and the political framework under which government decisions
are taken. Section 4 derives the political equilibrium with respect to the trade pol-
icy variable ﬁrst in general and then as a reaction to exogenous environmental policy.
Both the direction and the magnitude of the policy adjustment as well as the latter´s
determining factors are discussed. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Example: costless emissions permits
As mentioned in the introduction, governments can be expected to make certain policy
concessions to groups (here: industries) adversely aﬀected by environmental restric-
tions. With respect to the introduction of the EU-ETS, an immediate example for such
behavior is the costless allocation of emissions permits through the member countries´
NAPs. Such free allocation comprises two elements of a subsidy (see Johnston (2006),
pp. 188): The ﬁrst is the value of the allowances themselves. Those have a positive
market price as soon as emissions are traded, but industries receive them for free. The
second element is the ability of producers to pass through, to a certain extent, the
opportunity cost of holding an allowance to the price of their product.15
Whether the costless receipt of emissions allowances represents more a lump-sum or
rather a (distortive) unit-subsidy, depends on the speciﬁc allocation method applied:
Pure grandfathering of permits (i.e. a distribution independent of current output/emission
behavior) corresponds to a lump-sum subsidy whereas an output-based allocation corre-
sponds to a production subsidy. In reality, most countries follow a strategy “in-between”,
that contains elements of both allocation methods (for details see Demailly/Quirion
(2006)), so that modeling a production subsidy seems to be an appropriate approach.
The view that costless permit allocation constitutes an implicit subsidy, or, more specif-
15Besides this most obvious kind of industry subsidization, many other elements of NAPs may
provide the potential for implicit industry subsidization or compensation. Examples are new-entrant-
or plant-closure rules, the permission to make use of external credits like JI or CDM, the possibility
of banking emissions allowances to future periods or the provision of opt-out rules. For an overview of
NAP-features in the ﬁrst trading period 2005-07 that might constitute some form of subsidy, see e.g.
Betz et al. (2004), for the second trading period 2008-12 Rogge et al. (2006).The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 8
ically, in the EU case, an element of State Aid, is commonly held in the literature. For
example, Grubb/Neuhoﬀ (2006), pp. 14 characterize the phenomenon, analogously to
this paper, as “compensation for forgone proﬁts due to the environmental regulation”.
Smale et al. (2006), pp. 29, argue in a similar way. Johnston (2006), pp. 132, by taking
a legal perspective to approach the issue, comes to the same conclusion: He ﬁnds strong
arguments supporting the view that free allowances involve elements of State Aid. He
also points out that even the EU Commission adopts this view which became obvious
in its assessment of the French NAP (although no formal decision with respect to State
Aid was taken, see pp. 118).
In the ﬁrst emissions trading period 2005-07, the EU Commission allowed for auction-
ing of up to 5 percent of total emissions permits. However, only few countries made
use of this option (Denmark sold 5, Hungary 2.5, Lithuania 1.5 and Ireland 0.75 per-
cent), while all other EU members did not auction any permit but allocated the whole
amount for free. In the second trading period 2008-12, up to 10 percent allocation via
auctioning are allowed. But, again, only 10 out of 25 Member countries plan to choose
this allocation method (for an overview table see appendix 6). None of these countries,
however, fully uses up its permission of 10 percent auctioning.
A look at European NAPs also provides some evidence for this paper´s ﬁnding that
domestic polluting industries are not only compensated in exchange for environmen-
tal restrictions but even granted excess compensation: In the period 2005-07, many
European countries allocated more emission certiﬁcates to their industries than those
actually needed (and could thus sell on the market). The level of this over-allocation
(measured as share of allocated emissions permits that were not used up in total allo-
cation) ranges from 5 percent in Germany to 26 percent in Finland.16
These observations strongly support the notion that EU countries tend to compensate
their polluting industries by allocating costless emissions permits among them and that
they often do so in an excessive manner.
To get an impression of the monetary value of the subsidization, one can have a look
at the permit prices as they represent the value of the subsidy: The average price for
an allowance in 2005 was 19.9 Euros (although subject to high volatility with prices
ranging between 9 and 30 Euros, see CRS (2006), pp. 8). By the end of 2006, however,
permit prices have dropped to around 7 Euros and even further in January, 2007, to
around 4 Euros (see e.g. the webpage of the European Climate Exchange, ECX).
The number of (costlessly) allocated allowances in a country corresponds to its cap
on total CO2 emissions according to the NAP. In Germany, for example, 499 Mt of
emissions are allowed between 2005 and 2007, compared to expected 465 Mt from
2008-12 (data from the webpage of the German Environmental Ministry, BMU). In the
UK, for the ﬁrst ETS-phase 245 Mt emissions allowances were allocated compared to
238 Mt in the second phase (data from the UK Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Aﬀairs, defra). Hence, the value of these allowances in the ﬁrst phase can
16For data see http : assets.panda.orgdownloads/wwf_can_table.pdf.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 9
be roughly estimated as 9.98/4.9 billion Euros on average in Germany/the UK.
3 The model
3.1 Production
There are two sectors, I and II. Both exhibit constant returns to scale and there is
perfect competition on goods- and on factor markets. Supply of speciﬁc capital is ﬁxed
as well as total labor supply, i.e. LI +LII = L. Thus, an increase in labor in one sector
must be accompanied by a respective decrease in the other sector: 4LI = −4LII.
The import-competing “dirty” sector produces a good xI, a substitute to the foreign
good ximp, by using sector-speciﬁc capital K
I
, mobile labor LI and an environmental
factor E. Speciﬁcally, use of the environment (i.e. pollution) makes production more









LL < 0. (1)
Producers in sector I receive a subsidy s per unit of output. As a consequence, producer-
and consumer prices do not coincide:17 While consumers face the world market price
pw, producers receive the additional amount s: pp = pw + s.











where w is the wage rate. Proﬁt maximization yields the common result that labor is
paid its marginal product: w = ppg(E)F I
L.
The other sector, a “clean” one, produces a numeraire good by using sector-speciﬁc
capital K
II









LL < 0. (3)









Here, proﬁt maximization yields w = F II







and equal across sectors due to labor mobility.
17Let p denote the relative price of good I, i.e. the price of good I in terms of the numeraire good II.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 10



















The individual utility of a worker is determined by his level of income.19 It is assumed
that each worker supplies one unit of labor and that there is no unemployment. Thus,
labor income is w. The subsidy to the polluting sector is ﬁnanced via a lump-sum tax
on workers which implies that each of them bears an equal share of the total transfer
S = sxI. Hence, individual income of a worker is given by:





Environmental damage positively depends on total domestic emissions E and is repre-
sented by the convex damage function
D(E) with DE > 0 and DEE > 0, (9)
i.e. marginal damage is increasing in E. This kind of damage function abstracts from
transboundary pollution, i.e. negative eﬀects domestic (foreign) emissions have on the
foreign (domestic) environment are not considered.20
18In the following, the terms “proﬁt” and “return to the speciﬁc factor” will be used as synonyms.
19One might annotate that a worker´s utility should also be inﬂuenced by environmental damage as
each consumer will exhibit some kind of preference for a clean environment. In the political-support-
function approach applied here, however, a government is assumed to maximize political support over
diﬀerent interest groups (i.e. lobbies) which in turn represent their members´ common interests with
respect to a certain issue. Workers here are organized as a labor union which usually focuses on
issues directly related to labor, mainly income. Environmental concerns of workers, in this model, are
expressed via the environmental interest group (alternatively interpreted as “general environmental
interest”, see below): The stronger environmental concerns in a country are, the higher will be the
political weight of the environmental group. However, including environmental damage into a worker´s
utility function would not alter the qualitative results and inﬂuence the quantitative results in the same
way a higher political weight of the environmental interest group would do (see section 4.2).
20In the model framework applied in this paper, no other assumption on environmental damage
is sensible. Consider the case of global environmental problems in which it does not matter where
emissions are produced for world-wide damage to arise. The domestic damage function would then be
determined by world-wide emissions Ew: D = D(Ew) with Ew = Ed+EROW (d stands for “domestic”
and ROW for “Rest of the World”). The eﬀects of domestic environmental restrictions would only diﬀerThe Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 11
3.4 The government
In representative democracies like e.g. in European countries, governments are elected
by voters. It can be considered as the main goal of an incumbent government to be re-
elected. The probability of being re-elected is inﬂuenced by the support a government
receives from diﬀerent interest groups. This support can be interpreted as implicit or
explicit (re-)election recommendations to voters expressed by those lobbies.21,22 A com-
mon public appearance at events organized by the governing party resp. the lobby group
could for example constitute an implicit recommendation to vote for the government
(example: labor unions invite the president/chancellor). More explicit recommenda-
tions could be given in form of position papers or positive public statements concerning
a government position on some policy in the media (example: an industry representative
supports the government´s tax policies in a newspaper article).
Hence, a government maximizes a political support function G over diﬀerent interest
groups, where G is a weighted aggregate of those groups´ utilities. In doing so, tradeoﬀs
between opposing interests of diﬀerent groups have to be considered: A policy measure
which is beneﬁcial for one group and thus raises that group´s political support may be
harmful for another group and so decrease the latter group´s support in turn.
Interest groups which are considered by the government are ﬁrst of all the group of
workers, or labor (L), organized in a labor union. They enter G via income I according
from those analyzed in this paper (see section 4 and Appendix 1b) if the induced external eﬀects and



















Depending on sign and size of the term ∂E
ROW
∂Ed , positive eﬀects of domestic environmental policy may
be strengthened, weakened, leveled out or even reversed.
However, interdependencies between diﬀerent countries are not in the scope of this model as it focuses
on the unilateral introduction of environmental restrictions, implicitly assuming policies in ROW to be
given and ﬁxed. Alternatively, without explicitly modeling the foreign policy-choice, one could simply
assume some reaction of foreign emissions. This, however, would not add further insights to the analysis
as it could equivalently be expressed by simply modifying the damage function D which is not speciﬁed
anyway. An economically plausible example would be to assume −1 < ∂E
ROW
∂Ed < 0 ⇒ ∂D
∂Ed < ∂D
∂Ew,
i.e. positive eﬀects of domestic environmental policy are weakened by the foreign reaction. The
implications of varying levels of marginal environmental damage for the model results are discussed in
section 4.
21It should be mentioned here that, besides lobby recommendations, there are many more factors
determining whether a voter elects a government or not. Among them are e.g. the potential alter-
natives (other parties/coalitions), a voter´s personal satisfaction with current policies, general party
preferences/sympathies, etc. However, the probability that c.p. a government is re-elected can be
increased by interest groups´ political support.
22Campaign contribution payments are intendedly not mentioned here as the analysis focuses on
Europe, where such payments are not a common practice like for example in the US. In the EU, direct
lobbying of the government is a rather complicated process, in which money payments are oﬃcially
not prevalent. For details see http : //www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/pana/pdf/w5en_en.pdfThe Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 12
to eq. 8: The higher this income (and thus utility), the more labor representatives
support the government.
In addition, sectors I and II (i.e. the owners of the speciﬁc factors) are organized as
interest groups. As their goal can be seen to achieve maximum proﬁts, those groups
are represented by ΠI and ΠII (see eqs. 6 and 7) in G with political support depending
positively on the respective proﬁts.
Finally, there is an environmental lobby, i.e. a group that cares only about domestic
environmental quality.23 Its goal is to minimize environmental damage which is caused
by industry-I emissions. Thus, damage D enters the support function negatively, i.e. a
rise in environmental damage decreases political support by the environmental interest
group.24
A general political support function including all the above-mentioned groups is thus
given by: G = G(I,ΠI,ΠII,D). This function G is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Political support is assumed to increase with rising utility at a diminishing rate whereas
political opposition increases with rising disutility at an increasing rate. That is, the
political support function is concave in all its arguments (−)Vi, where (−)Vi stands for
the level of (dis)utility of any group i, as illustrated in Figure 1:
Within G, the government attaches diﬀerent weights to those groups´ utilities, depend-
ing on their ability to inﬂuence the government itself on the one hand and, on the other
hand, voter decisions (or “public opinion”). Because the government´s ultimate goal is
its own re-election, the former type of a lobby´s political inﬂuence is determined by the
latter type. Hence, the inﬂuence on public opinion is decisive for the political weight of
a lobby. How powerful an interest group is in this respect depends on several factors,
like its ﬁnancial means or its presence in the media for example, but also on more
subtle factors like the lobby´s reputation and general public preferences. For example,
in countries where people are environmentally aware, the environmental interest group
can be expected to have a strong inﬂuence on public opinion, which should translate
into a high political weight in the support function.
4 The political equilibrium
Due to the small-country assumption and the analysis of a trade policy instrument
not distorting consumer prices, the impacts of policy measures on the diﬀerent interest
groups´ utilities (except for the environmental IG) can be measured solely by changes
in their income.
23This assumption implies that environmentalists do not care about foreign, or world-wide pollution.
Hence, “greens” rather than “supergreens” are considered here.
24The term D in the support function (see below) may also be interpreted as some kind of general
environmental concern among the population which is considered by the government.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 13
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fig. 1: properties of the political support function G
Trade policy is represented by a subsidy s per unit of output to the polluting sector I,
which is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax on workers.25 The impacts of this policy measure
on the diﬀerent IG´s utilities are summarized in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 When the production subsidy to the polluting sector is raised, the return to
its speciﬁc factor rises (ΠI
s > 0), the return to the clean sector´s speciﬁc factor declines
(ΠII
s < 0), and the total income of a worker also declines (Is < 0). The environmental
IG´s utility is not aﬀected (Ds = 0).
Proof: See Appendix 1a. 2
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is that the subsidized sector I raises output as reaction
to the increased producer price of its good. This improves its own proﬁts but detracts
labor from sector II and so induces a proﬁt-decline there. Although workers, due to
the increased marginal product of labor, beneﬁt from an increase in the wage rate, this
positive income-eﬀect is outweighed by the higher subsidy-payments to sector I which
they have to pay for. Hence, workers´ total income declines. The environmentalists´
25If instead of a production subsidy, a trade policy instrument was analyzed which distorts not only
producer- but also consumer prices, the model applied here would not be appropriate anymore as no
explicit assumptions on consumer choices are taken.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 14
utility is solely determined by the national emissions level E which does not change
when the subsidy is raised.
Environmental policy is exerted via a (binding) quantitative cap on total emissions in
the polluting sector, E.26 The impacts of this policy measure on the diﬀerent IG´s
utilities are summarized in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 When environmental restrictions are strengthened, the return to the spe-
ciﬁc factor in the polluting sector declines (ΠI
E > 0), the return to the clean sector´s
speciﬁc factor rises (ΠII
E < 0), and the total income of a worker rises (IE < 0). The
environmental IG´s utility is also raised (DE > 0).
Proof: See Appendix 1b. 2
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is similar to what was explained with respect to Lemma
1: A stricter emissions cap decreases labor productivity (and thus wages) in the pollut-
ing sector so that labor moves from there to the clean sector. Output and proﬁts decline
in sector I and rise in sector II. For workers, the negative wage-eﬀect is outweighed by
the decline in subsidy-payments as output in the subsidized sector shrinks. Concerning
environmentalists, it is obvious that they beneﬁt from an improved environment.
As described in section 3.4, the government maximizes a political support function G
over all interest groups. The policy instrument available here is the subsidy to the
polluting sector I. The ﬁrst-order condition is given by:
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! = 0. (10)
Condition (10) implies that marginal political support from the winners of a subsidy
is equated to marginal political opposition from the respective losers and leads to the
choice of a unique subsidy s* which maximizes political support over all relevant groups.
The environmental interest group does not directly inﬂuence this choice because their
utility does not depend on s, as was shown above and in Appendix 1b.
In order to analyze a government´s incentive to compensate an industry for the in-
troduction of restrictive environmental policies, it is assumed that, departing from an
initial situation with no restrictions on environmental use at all, a binding cap on total
emissions in industry I, E, is introduced. This policy is considered to be exogenously
determined. Here, it should be mentioned that for the EU example which is used to
motivate this paper, the cap on total emissions necessary for achieving the Kyoto-target
is attempted to be achieved by an emissions trading scheme. The model, however, is
26Though it is not arguable that output-based instruments of emissions-control like taxes are more
eﬃcient than quantitative restrictions, such standards are more often observable in practice for dif-
ferent reasons already elaborated on by e.g. Buchanan/Tullock (1975). Hence, many papers deal-
ing with environmental-policy choice follow these ﬁndings and consider standards rather than taxes
(see e.g. Oates/Schwab (1988) or Bommer/Schulze (1999)). Recent examples include, as described
in the introduction, the Kyoto protocol or the US Clean Air Act (last amendment in 1990, see
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more general in that it does not consider how emissions reductions are achieved by the
government. Hence, eﬃciency considerations with respect to diﬀerent instruments of
environmental policy or the governmental decision problem as to how achieve a given
emissions reduction are not subject of this analysis.
4.1 The direction of the trade-policy adjustment
As discussed above, the “new” policy E will lead to losses in utility and thus political
support by some groups and to respective rises by other groups.
The question to be answered now is how trade policy, represented by the subsidy s, has
to be adjusted in order to keep political support at its maximum level. Formally, sign
and magnitude of ds
dE have to be determined. Total diﬀerentiation of eq. 10 yields:








The interpretation of eq. 11 is the following: How does the subsidy s have to be adjusted
after a decrease in total emissions dE in order to oﬀset the induced change in marginal
political support GsE by a countervailing change Gss so that marginal political support
Gs remains at the optimal (zero-) level? Proposition 1 states this paper´s ﬁrst result:
Proposition 1: In an economy where the government aims at sustaining a maximum
level of total political support, there is a negative relationship between the policy vari-
ables E and s, i.e. stricter environmental regulations induce increased protection of the
domestic polluting industry.
Proposition 1 follows from considerations on the signs of denominator and numerator
in eq. 11 that suggest both terms be negative:
The term Gss must be negative in order to meet the second-order condition for s* to
yield a maximum of political support. Speciﬁcally, this term is given by:27
Gss = GII(Is)











As pointed out in section 4, marginal political support is positive but diminishing by
assumption so that the ﬁrst, third and ﬁfth element of eq. 12 are negative. In order
to ensure the whole term to be negative, what remains to be determined are the signs
of Iss, ΠI
ss and ΠII
ss, i.e. of the second, fourth and sixth elements of the equation. The
common assumption of declining marginal utility/rising marginal disutility would imply
all three terms be negative.
27Following Bommer/Schulze (1999), p. 646, no so-called envy eﬀects are assumed to exist:
GViVj = 0 ∀ i 6= j, i.e. marginal utility of one group is not aﬀected by utility-changes of an-
other group.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 16
The numerator of eq. 11 is given by:













Similarly to the case of Gss, no unambiguous statements valid for all functional forms
can be made. However, economic-plausibility considerations suggest GsE to be negative
as well, as the term consists of very similar elements as Gss. The latter must be negative
for s∗ to meet the second-order condition for maximum political support. In case the
suﬃcient conditions for this, i.e. non-convexity of proﬁt- and income functions, are
fulﬁlled, it is economically plausible that also the respective conditions for GsE < 0 are
met, as the policy variables s and E impact on proﬁts and income in the same direction
(calculations in appendix 2 use the speciﬁc example of a Cobb-Douglas production
function to show that both Gss and GsE being negative is reasonable in a standard
analytical framework).
Proposition 1 leads to the conclusion that the government indeed has an incentive to
compensate the industry subject to environmental policies E by a rise in the subsidy-
rate s. Hence, part of the gain from environmental restrictions which is obtained by
the clean sector, workers and the environmental interest group is redistributed to the
losers from environmental policy, the polluting sector.
4.2 Magnitude and determining factors of the trade-policy ad-
justment
While the qualitative eﬀect of an increase in environmental regulations (i.e. a reduction
of emissions allowances) is now clear, the quantitative extent of this eﬀect remains to
be discussed. This extent determines whether the combination of environmental- and
trade policies leads to overall losses or beneﬁts for the diﬀerent interest groups compared
to their initial situation. For this purpose, the concept of “completeness” is introduced.
It is interpreted in terms of the initial income-distribution: Compensation of the losers
from environmental policy is complete if the induced change in trade policy retains the
initial income-distribution among industry I, II and workers. In that case, the increase
in s is termed “proportional” to the initial decrease in E. Most interesting for the general
issue under consideration in this paper is the overall impact of the policy mix on proﬁts
(and thus competitiveness) of the polluting sector.28 What turns out in the analysis is
a rather unexpected result stated in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: Compensation of sector I for losses caused by environmental policies
will be more than complete as long as the environmental interest (group) is attached
some political weight. In other words, the increase in the polluting sector´s welfare
28The case of complete compensation also implies that the initial level of total (economy-wide)
income is retained, i.e. that the overall income-loss from the distortion of production patterns induced
by environmental policy is completely oﬀset by trade policy.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 17
achieved by a higher subsidy is larger than that sector´s original loss due to a reduced
emissions allowance, i.e. it beneﬁts from a net welfare gain.
Proof: See Appendix 3. 2
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Proposition 2 is illustrated by ﬁgure 2: The iso-distribution curve shows all combina-
tions of policies s and E that lead to the same distribution of income among industries
I and II and workers. This curve is convex because of the assumption of diminishing
marginal utilities and rising marginal disutilities.29 The iso-support locus depicts all
combinations of s and E that induce the same level of overall political support. This
curve considers support levels of all groups, including the environmental IG: An indif-
ference curve of this group is depicted as a vertical line through the emissions level,
as the subsidy does not inﬂuence the environmentalists´ utility. Hence, a graphical
combination of the iso-distribution- and the environmental indiﬀerence-curve yields an
iso-support curve somewhere in-between, i.e. steeper than the iso-distribution locus.
In case the environmental group had no inﬂuence at all, the iso-distribution- and iso-
support curves would coincide, and compensation would be complete (i.e. s would be
increased so that the initial income-distribution is retained). However, in the presence
of some environmental interest, in order to keep political support constant after the
29For details on the slope of the iso-distribution curve see appendix 4.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 18
decrease in E, s has to be raised by more (i.e. from s0 to s10) than required to simply
retain income distribution (i.e. from s0 to s1). The ﬁgure also illustrates that industry I
is better oﬀ in the presence of an environmental interest group than it would be without
it, while industry II and workers are worse oﬀ.
What is the intuition behind these results? In addition to their impacts on income
distribution and in contrast to trade policy, environmental policies (resp. the induced
environmental improvements) have a value in themselves. As a consequence, a given
level of overall political support can be achieved by lower support from IGs other than
the environmental one if a country´s environmental performance is improved. That is,
the initial income-redistribution caused by E does not have to be reversed completely
by an adjustment in s. Hence, the new political equilibrium yields a net reduction
in aggregated political support from industries I and II and workers because declines
in support from the trade policy losers (industry II and workers) outweigh the rise in
support from the polluting industry I (due to the properties of the G-function, such a net
reduction is obtained if subsidization of sector I is increased more than proportionally).
This net decline is compensated by increased support from the environmental IG. The
result implies that the government has an interest in protecting the polluting industry
from international competition. Only in the presence of an environmental IG, however,
is it possible to do so without losing overall political support.30
So far, the analysis has shown that compensation will be more than complete. What
remains to be discussed are the factors responsible for the extent of this excess com-
pensation. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3: The extent of the polluting industry´s excess compensation is positively
aﬀected by the level of marginal environmental damage DE (equivalent to the absolute
pollution-level) and the political weight of the environmental interest. In addition, there
is a negative inﬂuence from the political weight of the clean industry and workers, that is,
of the loser group from protection. The impact of the polluting industry´s own political
weight is indeterminate.
Proof: See Appendix 5. 2
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 3 implies that, as a high level of marginal damage is
associated with a high pollution level, the political necessity to compensate an industry
for environmental restrictions is the higher, the “dirtier” this industry is. Furthermore,
environmental concerns (i.e. an environmental interest group) have a positive impact
on policies favoring the polluting industry (i.e. the subsidy) although environmental
damage is not aﬀected by those policies. The intuition is that in situations with severe
30Also other papers belonging to the political-economy literature ﬁnd that governments have a
preference for supporting domestic industries exposed to international competition (i.e. the import-
competing sector like in this paper), see Ederington/Minier (2003). The empirical observation that
trade protection is positively related to the degree of import-penetration (see the theory of endogenous
protection, e.g. in Treﬂer (1993)) is inter alia explained by risk-sharing motives of support-maximizing
governments: Supporting import-competing industries passes through part of their potential losses to
society (in this paper made up by the relevant interest groups).The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 19
pollution also the environmental IG´s utility and -political support are very sensitive to
environmental policies so that the potential for decreases in support from other groups
is large from the government´s point of view.
In terms of Figure 2, the degree of excess compensation, or, respectively, the extent to
which industry I is better oﬀ in the new equilibrium, can be measured by the diﬀerence
in the absolute values of the slopes of the iso-support- and iso-distribution curves in
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slope of iso-distribution curve at E0
. (14)
The more those slopes deviate from one another, the more will sector I be over-
compensated. The diﬀerence in the curves´ slopes in turn is mainly determined by




   





   











   
dist. | {z }
<0
. (15)
The second result concerning the clean industry and workers is immediately apparent
as these groups beneﬁt from environmental- and lose from trade policy: If they are
attached a higher political weight, compensation of the polluting industry and thus
losses of these groups will be lower.
Part three of proposition 3 implies that it is well possible that a high political weight
of the polluting industry has a detrimental eﬀect on the compensation it can expect
for restrictive environmental regulations. A negative impact of its own political weight
arises in a setting where environmental-policy impacts on proﬁts are relatively weak
compared to trade-policy impacts. Hence, if industry I was aware of this interrelation,
it should prefer not to demonstrate too much political inﬂuence in order to avoid being
attached a too large weight by the government and so be worse oﬀ in the political
equilibrium.
Expressed graphically, the iso-support curve becomes ﬂatter when industry II and/or
workers are weighted more and either steeper, ﬂatter or unchanged when industry I is
weighted more. The iso-distribution locus, however, is unaﬀected. Hence, the degree to
which groups are worse/better oﬀ in the presence of an environmental interest group
than without it may vary with the political weights.
31This holds for equal political weights of all interest groups. How diﬀerences between those weights
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5 Conclusion
This paper examined the impacts of exogenous environmental regulations on the choice
of trade policy and on the international competitiveness of the polluting sector in a
small open economy.
It turned out that there is an incentive for a political-support maximizing government
to compensate the polluting sector for restrictive environmental policies by increasing
that sector´s output subsidization: The country becomes more protectionist when en-
vironmental restrictions are imposed exogenously.
In contrast to what might be expected and to what is claimed by industry representa-
tives in the public debate, a net gain in international competitiveness for the polluting
sector arises. In other words, industry compensation will be more than complete. The
reason for this outcome is an environmental interest group whose political support is
positively aﬀected by increased environmental regulations and not aﬀected at all by
trade policy. Hence, their gain from the initial decrease in the emissions allowance is
not touched by the following increase in the subsidy. Maximum political support can
thus be retained even if support from other groups than the environmental interest
declines; an outcome which is achieved by increasing the polluting industry´s proﬁts by
more than their initial loss (or, by more than in case the environmental interest group
did not exist).
Due to rising marginal environmental damage and a positive impact of marginal damage
on the degree of industry compensation as shown in this paper, this feature is especially
relevant in countries at a high level of development. It is known from the literature on
the environmental Kuznets-curve (EKC),32 that the level of environmental protection
positively depends on a country´s GDP (after a certain threshold is passed, i.e. the
curve has a U-shape). The reason is that preferences for a clean environment rise with
increasing wealth of the population.
What does this imply for the public debate e.g. on the economic consequences of the
Kyoto-protocol resp. the EU-ETS? Industry concerns about losses in competitiveness in
terms of proﬁt declines are, according to this paper´s analysis, completely unjustiﬁed.
On the contrary, the polluting sector can even expect to be better-oﬀ if exogenous
environmental restrictions are implemented. Two conclusions can be drawn from this
ﬁnding: First, interest groups adversely aﬀected by some policy measure should consider
that there is more than one policy instrument available to politicians. As in the model
discussed here, compensation for potential income-losses can be expected in terms of
a diﬀerent policy instrument if the instrument directly under discussion is restricted
exogenously, e.g. by international agreements. Second, lobbies should also be aware
that the government aims at maximizing overall political support from all relevant
interest groups, thus trading oﬀ gains and losses from diﬀerent groups against each
32See e.g. the theoretical work by Selden/Song (1994) or empirical studies by Grossman/Krueger
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other. This creates the chance of being more than compensated for potential losses.
Taken together and re-considering the example of the EU dirty-industry´s arguments
in the run-up to the ETS introduction, those ﬁndings suggest that expectations of
interest groups concerning adverse policy-impacts are potentially biased towards being
too pessimistic.
At this point, alternative approaches to analyze the issue under consideration in this
paper should be mentioned as well as some propositions for future research.
One remark concerns the application of a sector-speciﬁc-capital model of international
trade. This implies a short-run perspective as in the long run, capital will be mobile
between sectors. A more farsighted perspective was e.g. taken by Copeland/Taylor
(2003) who developed a Heckscher-Ohlin-type model of trade between two countries
diﬀerently endowed with labor, capital and an environmental factor (the latter´s avail-
ability determined by environmental policy). Their analysis, however, does not contain
political-economy aspects.
Inter-sectoral capital mobility in the political-economy framework applied here leads
to a plausibility problem. The government is assumed to maximize support over dif-
ferent interest groups. With mobile capital, factors (i.e. “capital” and “labor”) rather
than sectors would have to form lobbies. While this is not much of a problem to be
thought of for the case of labor (and has already been done in the present paper),
the formation of a lobby representing the whole factor “capital” is hard to imagine as
interests are likely to diﬀer a lot between diﬀerent sectors of production. If, despite
this problem, a Heckscher-Ohlin framework is applied to analyze the distributional-
and political-support eﬀects of environmental- and trade policy and the induced con-
sequences for policy determination, the basic results should not diﬀer from those in
the sector-speciﬁc-capital case: According to the Stolper Samuelson Theorem, capital
loses real income when environmental restrictions are introduced if the polluting (i.e.
environmental factor-intensive) sector is assumed to be also capital-intensive. On the
other hand, labor beneﬁts. Like before, in order to retain maximum political support,
the government partly compensates capital by raising the subsidy. The reason for the
incompleteness of compensation is the same as in the sector-speciﬁc-capital model: The
presence of the environmental interest group.
Overall, the additional beneﬁt from considering inter-sectoral capital mobility is at
most small, especially when compared to the additional plausibility problem that arises
with respect to the political-economy framework. The sector-speciﬁc-capital model thus
seems to be the more appropriate framework here.
Building on the analysis carried out in this paper, some questions for future research
arise. First of all, especially as the model is tailored to the example of the European
Union, a model of a large open economy should be considered alternatively. Does this
change the results due to terms-of-trade eﬀects of environmental- and/or trade policies?
Here, it has to be considered that in the large-country case, also consumer prices are
aﬀected by domestic policy measures. Hence, a diﬀerent setup of the model explicitly
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A second issue that could be added to the present framework is international mobility
of capital: Which results could be derived if the location decision of ﬁrms was explicitly
modeled? To answer that question, a framework of policy interactions between diﬀerent
countries competing for capital/FDI appears to make sense.
Furthermore, this paper´s assumption of unilaterally introduced environmental restric-
tions (motivated by the example of the EU-ETS vs. “rest of the world”) ignores that
other countries might react to domestic policies or, put diﬀerently, that countries might
interact strategically with each other. It would be interesting to see how the feature
that the domestic country introduces certain policy measures by anticipating a foreign
country´s reaction and taking this into account changes the results of the analysis (see
also the remark on global environmental problems in section 3.3).
Another interesting point to consider could be ﬁrm heterogeneity. In particular, one
could analyze how the results change due to the assumption that ﬁrms in the polluting
sector diﬀer with respect to their eﬃciency. In that case, more eﬃcient ﬁrms possibly
exhibit opposing interests to the less eﬃcient ones, i.e. favor rather than oppose strict
environmental policies. This is due to their ability to increase market share in case the
less eﬃcient ﬁrms are driven out of the market by the environmental policy measure.
Another possible implication of ﬁrm heterogeneity could be that sectoral competitive-
ness is not necessarily declining due to the introduced environmental/trade policy mix
because less eﬃcient production is (partly) replaced by more eﬃcient production.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 23
A Appendix 1a
The following calculations and arguments are to show how trade policy, represented by
a production subsidy to sector I, impacts on the diﬀerent IG´s incomes resp. utilities.
Sector I:
Clearly, the subsidy is favorable for proﬁts in the polluting industry: When pro-
duction in sector I is subsidized, the remuneration of labor in that sector rises
(as L is paid its marginal product; see eq. 5 ). Thus, labor is attracted to the
subsidized sector (LI
s > 0) and production of good I rises. In addition, due to the
small-country assumption, the producer price rises by the amount of the subsidy-
increase: pp
s = pw


























Because of the ﬁxed total labor supply, an increase in LI, caused by the increased
subsidization, is accompanied by a proportional decrease in LII. Production of












s < 0. (A.2)
Workers:
Workers will be aﬀected by trade policy in the following way: When the govern-
ment raises the subsidy, the marginal product of labor will rise; hence, the wage
rate w will increase, though, due to the diminishing marginal product of labor,





s > 0. (A.3)
Remark: This is also true for the real wage as the consumer price of the im-
port good I, pw, is constant due to the small-country assumption as well as the
numeraire-price (=1).
On the other hand, the amount each worker has to pay to ﬁnance the subsidy to
industry I, sxI
L , increases, so that the overall change in income is given by:
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Besides the positive “wage eﬀect”, there are two negative eﬀects on income: The
“subsidy eﬀect” arises because the subsidy level per unit of output is increased,
and the “scale eﬀect” mirrors the rising production scale where for each additional
unit of output an additional unit of the subsidy s has to be paid. Economic-
plausibility considerations suggest that the positive wage eﬀect be outweighed by
the two negative eﬀects so that Is < 0 holds.
The opposite case would imply that workers were able to increase their income
by paying an increased amount of tax. Hence, from their point of view, inﬁnite
taxation would be preferred which is not consistent with economic intuition. In
addition, if the economy as a whole is considered, total income must, in general,
decrease due to trade policy measures as those cause distortions (here, a distortion
in production patterns). If Is were positive, the decline in sector-II proﬁts caused
by an increase in the subsidy would have to outweigh the rise in both sector I-
proﬁts and workers´ income in order to yield a decline in total income. This,
simply by looking at the respective equations, is not plausible. Rather, |ΠI
s| >
|ΠII
s | will hold which implies Is < 0 (see also the calculation in appendix 2).
Environmental IG:
The utility of the environmental interest group only depends on total emissions E.
Those are not determined endogenously in the model via output. When the sub-
sidy is increased, the dirty industry raises output, given a certain level of environ-
mental use. That is, output expansions can be achieved solely by increased labor
employment without aﬀecting the level of pollution (within this model framework,
this feature may e.g. be thought of as pollution depending on the operating time
of a factory in hours per day. When more labor is employed, output per hour
rises so that the operating time of the factory and thus pollution remain at their
initial levels. Apart from the model framework applied here, output-increases at
constant emissions levels can also be achieved e.g. by R&D, resp. by using more
advanced and cleaner technology).
Consequently, changes in the subsidy do not aﬀect emissions, environmental dam-
age and the environmental interest group´s utility.
Remark: One might annotate here, that an environmental lobby´s utility should
also depend negatively on the subsidy s. Although trade policy does not inﬂuence
environmental damage, it constitutes a support for the polluting industry which
environmentalists are generally opposed to. In addition, it is questionable whether
they completely anticipate the independence of environmental damage and the
subsidy. However, including s into the environmentalists´ utility function does
not alter the qualitative results of the analysis as long as the utility-impact of
trade policy is not stronger than that of environmental policy, which seems to be
plausible in case the former does not impact on environmental damage.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 25
B Appendix 1b
The following calculations and arguments are to show how environmental policy, repre-
sented by a quantitative cap on total emissions E, impacts on the diﬀerent IG´s incomes
resp. utilities.
Sector I:
As opposed to trade policy, environmental restrictions have a negative impact
on industry-I proﬁts. Put diﬀerently, a change in E has the same qualitative
eﬀects as an equivalent change in s as both policies work in the same direction.
However, quantitative eﬀects may diﬀer: When total emissions are allowed to
increase, similarly as in case of an increase in s, production in sector I becomes
more eﬃcient so that labor is attracted as the wage rate increases. Production




E = 0. Hence, the return to the speciﬁc factor in sector I unambiguously
declines when E is restricted:
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II < 0. (B.2)
Workers:
A decline in the total emissions allowance has the opposite eﬀect on the wage rate





E > 0. (B.3)
As in case of a change in s, there is an additional “scale eﬀect” on total income
of a worker as a decline in E will lower output of the polluting good. Unlike
the former case, however, there is no “subsidy eﬀect” because the level of s is
unchanged. Thus we have:











With respect to IE, like in the analysis in the preceding section, the case IE < 0
is considered. This seems straightforward because it implies that, as for the two
speciﬁc factors, both policy instruments aﬀect income in the same direction.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 26
Remark: However, both a positive and a negative sign are consistent with economy-
wide income to decline due to ineﬃciencies caused by the policy intervention.
For the case IE > 0 the results of the model concerning the direction of trade-
policy adjustment are unaﬀected. Results concerning the “completeness” of in-
dustry compensation (see section 4.2), however, then depend on the relative size
of marginal environmental damage as compared to marginal income-eﬀects from
environmental- and trade policy. Theoretically, results opposing those derived
in section 4.2 become possible, though only under certain conditions. Hence, as
this would unnecessarily complicate the analysis and, as argued above, assuming
IE < 0 seems plausible, the case IE > 0 it not further investigated here.
Environmental IG:
Environmental damage is obviously reduced by environmental restrictions, i.e.
the utility of the environmental interest group is positively aﬀected.
C Appendix 2
The following calculations apply the general expressions derived in this paper to a
speciﬁc Cobb-Douglas production function and a simple example of a political support
function. The aim is to show that standard functional forms can satisfy the conditions
under which the results of this paper hold.





1−α with α =
1
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, i = I,II. (C.1)














where γi, i=1,2,3,4 are the political weights.
Sector I:







- Marginal proﬁts with respect to s and E are always positive as derived in
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For our speciﬁc production function, this expression is not negative as pro-







I > 0. (C.7)









































E >< 0. (C.8)







I > 0. (C.9)
- As argued in section 4, marginal political support from industry I with re-













2 < 0. (C.10)
Sector II:







- Marginal proﬁts with respect to s and E are always negative as derived in
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- The second derivative of sector-II proﬁts with respect to s is, similarly to
















II] >< 0 (C.14)








I < 0. (C.15)

































I < 0. (C.17)
- Political support from sector II is characterized by analogous functional pat-













2 < 0. (C.18)
Workers:
- The total income of a workers equals the wage minus subsidy payments:






- As shown in Appendix 1a, marginal income with respect to s is determined by












Marginal income with respect to E consists of two elements as shown in












- The second derivative of I with respect to s is again ambiguous in general:










ss >< 0. (C.22)














has to be fulﬁlled.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 29
- Also the second derivative with respect to E has an ambiguous sign in general
as well as for the speciﬁc production function:









sE >< 0. (C.24)





























2 < 0. (C.26)
Total political support:
Using the preceding calculations, what can be concluded with respect to the
properties of marginal political support from all IGs (i.e. the sign of Gss, see eq.
12)?
- As already mentioned in the text, terms 1, 3 and 5 are always negative solely
due to the properties of the political support function.
- Term 2 remains ambiguous even if our speciﬁc functional forms are used:





- Term 4 turned out to be positive in our case: GΠIΠI
ss > 0.
- Term 6 is negative here: GΠIIΠII
ss < 0.
Comparing both elements of Gss representing industry I (terms 3 and 4) leads
to the result that they are equal in absolute values here. Hence, the only un-
ambiguously positive term in Gss completely cancels out. What remains, are
three deﬁnitively negative terms and one which can be negative under a certain
condition. This condition however, is not necessary for Gss to be negative.
To conclude, the additional assumption of w and L being suﬃciently small relative
to KII can ensure Gss < 0 in our speciﬁc example, but even without this additional
assumption, marginal political support is very likely to be decreasing in s.
Concerning GsE (eq.13), the above calculations yield an analogous conclusion as
also there, terms 3 and 4 cancel out. Also for GsE < 0 to be ensured, w and
L have to be suﬃciently small relative to KII, but this does not constitute a
necessary condition.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 30
D Appendix 3
The following reasoning is supposed to explain the ﬁnding of excess compensation
granted to the polluting industry, as stated in proposition 2.
As laid out in appendix 2, under reasonable assumptions, GsE < 0 will hold. This
implies that marginal political support, Gs, increases when E is introduced (i.e. E
reduced). Increased marginal support in turn implies a decrease in total support because
of the assumption of diminishing marginal support:
dE < 0 ⇒ dGs > 0 ↔ dG < 0. Thus, restrictive environmental policies E lead to an
overall decline in political support, aggregated over all groups, i.e. losses in sector-I
proﬁts exceed gains in sector-II proﬁts, workers´ income and environmental interests:








E | {z }
>0





E| > |GIIE + GΠIIΠ
II
E + GDDE|. (D.1)
An increase in Gs, however is not optimal, as from the ﬁrst-order condition of support
maximization we know that Gs = 0 has to hold. In order to re-establish the initial level
of maximum political support, politicians react by increasing s. As Gss < 0, a higher s
leads to a decline in Gs, or, equivalently, to a rise in G: ds > 0 ⇒ dGs < 0 ↔ dG > 0.
Speciﬁcally, increased subsidization of industry I causes support from sector I to rise
and support from sector II and workers to decline. Support from the environmental
group, however, is unaﬀected:








s | {z }
<0





s| > |GIIs + GΠIIΠ
II
s + 0|. (D.2)
Comparing eqs. D.1 and D.2 shows that for the trade-policy case (eq. D.2), the
increase in political support from sector I (inducing the intended reduction in Gs) has
to compensate for only two countervailing eﬀects (i.e. decreased support from sector II
and workers inducing “undesirable” increases in Gs). In contrast, when environmental
policy is applied (eq. D.1), three countervailing eﬀects have to be outweighed because
the environmental interest and its political support are aﬀected in addition. Hence, the
diﬀerence between the LHS and the RHS of the lower part of eq. D.2 will be larger
than the respective diﬀerence in eq. D.1 for proportional policy changes.
Consequently, in order to achieve a rise in political support G (respectively, a decline
in marginal support Gs), which exactly cancels out the initial decline in G (rise in
Gs) and hence retain the optimum Gs = 0, the subsidy has to be raised more than
proportionally to the initial decrease in E, that is, by more than necessary to retain the
initial income-distribution.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 31
This result can be explained by the properties of the political support function. In
order to “close the gap” between the deviations of the LHSs from the RHSs of eqs. D.2
and D.1, which arises due to the missing environmental-IG eﬀect in eq. D.2, the LHS
of eq. D.2 has to decline relative to the RHS. As industry I gains from the increased
subsidy and thus raises support at a declining rate, the term |GΠIΠI
s| is the smaller,
the larger the increase in s. On the other hand, industry II and workers lose from the
increased subsidy and thus raise their opposition at an increasing rate, so that the term
|GIIs + GΠIIΠII
s | is the larger, the higher the increase in s. Hence, only an adjustment
of s which is more than proportional can retrieve the initial level of political support.
Remark: The increase in the subsidy, however, cannot be arbitrarily large as it has to be
ﬁnanced by workers. At some threshold value of s, their labor income will be completely
“eaten up” by the lump-sum subsidy they have to pay, yielding a total income of zero.
From this point on, further subsidy increases are not attainable anymore. Hence, the
analysis in this paper assumes that s is suﬃciently small for not reaching its upper
bound.
E Appendix 4
The slope of the iso-distribution curve is, on the one hand, given by ds
dE| dw
dE=0, that is,
equal income distribution is ensured where wages and thus labor allocation and proﬁts
are constant. When E is decreased from E0 to E, labor productivity and wages decline.
In order to keep w constant, s has to be raised from s0 to s0
1 in turn.
In addition to this “direct” productivity eﬀect, there is also an opposing “indirect” one.
This is due to the fact that decreased productivity after a decrease in E detracts labor
from the aﬀected sector thus making the remaining labor more productive. In order to












L | {z }
indirect eﬀect >0
.
However, the direct eﬀect will outweigh the indirect one so that the overall relation
between s and E is a negative one.
In addition, as workers not only receive wages as income but also have to ﬁnance the
subsidy (i.e. I = w − sxI
L ), dI
dE| dw
dE=0 = 0 has to hold. The introduction of E reduces the
output of the polluting good although labor allocation is constant (see eq. 1), which
leads to a decline in total subsidy payments S. When the subsidy is then increased
properly, the rise in income I is counteracted exactly by a rise in s so that workers´
income is held constant.
That is: dI
dE













dE = −gEF I(LI,KI) s
xI = −
gEs
g(E).The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 32
Hence, the slope of the iso-distribution curve is negative. Convexity follows from a pos-
itive second derivative d2s
dE2 which can be shown to hold under reasonable assumptions.
F Appendix 5
The following reasoning is supposed to explain the results with respect to the determi-
nants of excess compensation as summarized by proposition 3:
(1) Positive impact of environmental factors:
The reasoning in appendix 3 implies that marginal environmental damage DE
is an important determinant of excess compensation as it is responsible for the
change in political support from the environmental interest group (GDDE). This
in turn is crucial for the diﬀerence in the levels of the “countervailing eﬀects” the
change in support from sector I has to outweigh to fulﬁll eq. D.2 compared to
eq. D.1. As argued above, the extent of excess compensation follows from this
diﬀerence (the “gap”). Hence, the more environmental damage is reduced by the
introduction of E, the more the environmental group increases political support
and the more trade policy has to be adjusted to retain the political optimum.
An analogous argument holds with respect to the political weight of environmental
interests as this, via GD, also determines the change in political support from the
environmental IG.
(2) Negative impact of other income-receivers:
Both the increase in support (or, equivalently, decrease in marginal support) from
industry II and workers after the introduction of E and the respective decrease in
support (or increase in marginal support) after the increase in s will be stronger for
higher political weights (see eqs. D.1 and D.2). However, the reinforcement of the
initial environmental-policy eﬀect will be outweighed by the following reinforce-
ment of the trade-policy eﬀect for two reasons following from the properties of the
political support function: Firstly, environmental-policy eﬀects are weaker than
the respective trade-policy eﬀects because they originate from a higher level of
overall political support (lower level of marginal support) and secondly, declines
in support outweigh rises in support, also due to declining marginal support.
Hence, the necessity of increasing s more than proportionally in order to induce a
net reduction of political support from the income-receiving groups and so retain
the political optimum weakens as the political weights of the clean industry and
workers increase.
(3) Ambiguous impact of own political weight:
Results are not as clear-cut when the political weight of the loser of environmen-
tal policy, respectively the winner of trade policy (industry I), is considered: IfThe Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 33
this group is attached a higher weight, also both environmental- and trade-policy
eﬀects become stronger, the former inducing a more pronounced rise in marginal
political support, the latter a more pronounced decrease in marginal support. Un-
like the industry II- and workers´ case, it is not clear which eﬀect will be stronger
as environmental policy induces a decline- and trade policy a rise in support.
Hence, the inﬂuence of political weight on the extent of compensation depends on
which eﬀect dominates. This rather paradoxical result can be explained by the
fact that both the negative impact of environmental policy (c.p. weakening the
necessity of increasing s) and the positive impact of a subsidy (c.p. strengthening
the necessity of increasing s) on total political support increase with rising weight
of the aﬀected group. Which impact dominates the other is ambiguous.The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 34
G Appendix 6



































1: Data for 2005-07 are from the EU-webpage 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/ets_co2_emission_auctioning.pdf. (latest data 
from 10/06)
2: Data for 2008-12 are from Rogge et al. (2006) and WWF (2006) on 
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_can_table.pdf (latest data from 11/06)
3: Most of this information is preliminary as not all countries have submitted their NAPs to the EU 
Commission yet (for Austria, however, a draft NAP can be downloaded from the country´s 
"Lebensministeriums" homepage), submitted NAPs have not been 
competely assessed by the Commission yet and those already assessed still have to be modified by 
the member states (cp. e.g. the webpage
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1650&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en)The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation 35
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